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RELATION BETWEEN SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURTY
LEO CARmIN*

Although instructions to the jury may be, and usually
are, under the local practice, drafted and proposed by counsel, still they are read to the jury by the court and purport to be, and by adoption are, instructions by the court.
Most instructions, separately, do not purport nor intend to
instruct the jury as to all the law of the case needing exposition, but only as to particular phases of the law. Hence
most instructions, although sufficiently intelligible standing
alone, are incomplete in the sense that additional instructions may be necessary or expedient to inform the jury fully
as to the whole law of the case. Corollary to these observations, results the familiar rule that instructions are to be
read and construed as a whole; and out of this rule, comes
the salutary doctrine that an instruction which is merely
incomplete, even as to the particular phase of law with which
it is peculiarly concerned, will be aided by another instruction which supplies the missing element.' Hence two incomplete instructions, each, alone, bad because of its incompleteness, may supplement each other, each supplying to the
other a missing element. So it can be said that what
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
%State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230 (1902); State -v. Cottrill,
52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. R. 244 (1902).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1930], Art. 3

314

SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS ETC.

amounts to a fault in one instruction may be corrected by
what is said in another instruction. But the rule operates
only when the correction is by way of supplement, and not
when it is by way of contradiction. Wherefore, if an instruction is bad because of something which it contains-a misstatement of the law, for instance-rather than because of something which it merely lacks, it cannot be aided
by another instruction which contradicts the bad matter.
When two instructions are merely incomplete, but mutually
helpful, it will be presumed that the jury gave united effect
to them both. However, if two instructions are contradictory, it is impossible to give effect to them both; and
while the result of giving effect to the good one would be
to nullify the bad one, it might be impossible to determine
which one the jury followed.2
The doctrine that an incomplete instruction may be aided
by another instruction has usually been qualified by one
prominent exception, namely, that a binding instruction
must be complete within itself and cannot be aided by way
of supplement or otherwise by another instruction.8
A binding instruction is one which enumerates certain
hypotheses upon finding the truth of which the jury are
told that they must find for (or against) a stated party.
It may be very complex or it may be very simple, depending
upon the circumstances. Usually, when propounded by the
2 McKelvy v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 35 W. Va. 500, 14 S. E. 261
(1891) ; Osborne v. Francis, 38 W. Va. 312, 18 S. E. 591, 45 Am. St. Rep.
859 (1893); Cobb v. Dunlevie, 63 W. Va. 398, 60 S. E. 384 (1908); Producers Coal Co. v, Mifflin Coal Mining Co., 82 W. Va. 311, 95 S. E. 948
(1918).
For numerous cases from other jurisdictions, see 14 R. C. L. 813;
38 Cyc. 1782 et seq.
"It has also been held that where there are inconsistent expressions in
instructions it is to be presumed that those last used were accepted by
the jury as controlling." 14 R. C. L. 815, citing State v. Yanz, 74 Conn.
177, 50 Atl. 37, 92 Am. St. Rep. 205, 54 L. R. A. 780 (1901). But this view
certainly is greatly in the minority and it is believed that the presumption
is unwarranted.
3 Shaffer v. Consolidation Coal Co., 151 S. E. 326 (W. Va. 1929); Freeman v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 98 W. Va. 311, 128 S. E. 129
(1924) ; Evans -v. Kirson, 88 W. Va. 343, 106 S. E. 647 (1921). Only a
few of the later West Virginia cases are cited. For cases in accord from
other states, see 38 Cyc. 1787.
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plaintiff, it is complex, and when propounded by the defendant (unless based on an affirmative defense), it is simple;
because the plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of establishing affirmatively all the material elements of his cause,
which are multiple, while a wholly sufficient defense may
be established by contradicting a single one of those elements.
Of course, the process may be reversed where the declaration
is confessed because the general issue is not pleaded and
the defendant relies on an affirmative plea. A court is not
warranted in telling the jury, through the medium of a
binding instruction, that they must find for (or against) a
stated party, unless the instruction contains every hypothesis, affirmative or negative in character, based on the
evidence and the pleadings, upon which, nothwithstanding
other matters in the instruction, the jury might find othervise.
When the true nature of a binding instruction is comprehended, it seems entirely logical to reach the conclusion
that, if it is incomplete in any of its elements, it cannot be
supplemented by another instruction. To permit such a
result would essentially be to permit an instruction which,
although usually described as incomplete, is really bad because of a statement which it contains, to be cured by an
instruction containing a contradictory statement. A binding instruction lacdng a necessary hypothesis is something
more, and worse, than a merely incomplete instruction. It
not only lacks something which is necessary-the omitted
hypothesis-but it also contains something which is wrong
-a positive direction to find a certain way on an insufficient
number of hypotheses. To permit the jury to seek the missing hypothesis in some other instruction and so take it into
consideration would be to contradict the mandate of the
binding instruction which tells them to find a verdict on
what is stated in it. Properly analyzed, the question is
whether a bad (not merely incomplete) instruction can be
cured by one which contradicts it. Wherefore the situation
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must be governed by the rule which applies to inconsistent
instructions."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has frequently said that a binding instruction lacking a necessary
element cannot be aided by another instruction.' However,
cases may be noted where the principle seems to have been
obscured, if not submerged, by the prominence given to that
other doctrine, that instructions are to be read together and
considered as a whole. For example, in Bartlett v. Bankc of
Manningto, it would seem that the court committed error
through misapplication of the latter principle to the exclusion of the former. In that case, a binding instruction was
given on behalf of the plaintiff. Apparently, it lacked an
element (described as the defendant's theory of defense)
necessary in it as a binding instruction and therefore was
not merely incomplete but positively bad. The court, adverting to the fact that the record failed to show, as it should
have done, that no othfer instructions were given, says:
"Its (the instruction's) omission of the defendant's
theory is unobjectionable, if the court gave one submitting that theory. Instructions are to be read and
considered as a whole, and if, being so read, they
correctly state the law, the inconsistency or conflict
of the opposing theories does not vitiate them, for
that is an element or factor in almost every jury
trial."
A similar view seems to have been taken in the dissenting
opinion in the very recent case of Shaffer v. Consoldated
Coal Company,' although the majority opinion expressly
recognizes and applies the orthodox rule.
In the Bartlett Case, the court, seeming to have lost sight
of the significance of a binding instruction, held that the
4 The fact that the situation involves inconsistent instructions has been
recognized by the Illinois and Indiana courts. Illinois Iron & Metal Co. v.
Weber, 196 Ill. 526, 63 N. E. 1008 (1902); Lake Shore & M. S. R.. Co. 'V.
Richards, 40 Ill. App. 560 (1892); Chicago v. Fields, 139 Ill. App. 250
(1908) ; Belvidere City R.. Co. v. Bute, 128 fl1. App. 620 (1906); Osber v.
Zadek, 120 IlL App. 444 (1905); Nickey v. Steuder, 164 Ind. 189, 73 N. E.
117 (1905).
5 See cases cited in n. 3.
677 W. Va. 329, 87 S. E. 444 (1915).
7 N. 3 supra.
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instruction was sufficient on the assumption that other instructions may have been given which supplied the defendant's theory of its case. Such reasoning would have been
logical if the court had been dealing with an instruction
which was not binding. But the instruction being a binding one, incapable of being aided by another one, it would
seem that, lacking a necessary element, it should have been
held bad whether other instructions were given or not.
Another very recent case, Shumaker v. Thomaw, in which
the court departs from the general rule as frequently stated
in prior decisions, is interesting because it may indicate an
intention of the court to establish an exception rather than
to indulge in a departure from the rule. The intention of
the court in this respect is not clear, because it does not
indicate that it is conscious of any unusual situation or is
aware that its statements need reconciliation with anything
that has been said in other cases. The court says:
"Plaintiff's instruction No. 1, after reciting, as a
preamble, the city ordinance fixing the speed
limit of all vehicles at 10 miles per hour on approaches
to bridges, directed the jury to find for the plaintiff,
if they believe from the evidence that he was struck
while the truck was being operated on the approach
to the bridge in excess of 10 miles per hour, in a
reckless, careless and negligent manner, and that
the driving of the truck in excess of 10 miles per hour,
in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner, was the
proximate cause of the collision, "theplaintiff himself
being without fault at the time of receiving the in'.
.
jury.
"The defendants assert that each instruction
ignores the defense of contributory negligence, or at
least, as such defense was presented therein by recital
only, the jury may have understood the court to mean
that the plaintiff was without fault. The latter point
of criticism would merit s~arious consideration, if
there had been no other instructions fairly presenting
the defense to the jury, but several other instructions,
z161

S. E. 178 (W. Va. 1929).
* Italics ours.
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given at the instance of the defendants, told the jury
to find for the defendants, notwithstanding negligence
on their part, if the jury believed from the evidence
that the plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence
contributing approximately to his injury. The instructions, therefore, in our opinion, considered as a
whole, clearly submitted to the jury the issue of contributory negligence."
It will be noted that this instruction does not ignore the
question of contributory negligence, but presents it to the
jury in the form of an ambiguity. The phrase, "the plaintiff
himself being without fault at the time of receiving the injury," may be taken, as the defendants argue, as an assertion
by the court that the plaintiff was without fault; or it may
be taken to have the meaning as if it read, "provided that
the plaintiff (or the jury finding that the plaintiff) himself
was without fault at the time of receiving the injury." If
it be given the former meaning, the instruction would be
bad because there was evidence tending to prove that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and the question was one of fact for the jury to decide. On the other
hand, if the phrase be given the alternative meaning, the
instruction is sufficient, because it would direct the jury to
consider the question of contributory negligence. Hence
reference to other instructions would be necessary, not for
the purpose of supplying an absolute omission, but for the
purpose of explaining an ambiguity in the binding instruction. Does this case warrant a modification of the general
rule, to the effect that, while another instruction cannot
supply an essential element omitted from a binding instruc-,
tion, yet it may lend aid by way of explaining an ambiguity?
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